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Rethinking the Relationship Between Punishment
and Policing
Kiel Brennan-Marquez*
Responding to Gabriel Mendlow, Why Is it Wrong To Punish Thought?, 127
YALE L. J. 2342 (2018).

I.
Gabriel Mendlow has published a rich and provocative essay on thought
crimes. 1 In it, he argues that punishing thoughts is wrong, in essence, because mind
control is wrong. According to Professor Mendlow, (1) we enjoy a right of"mental
integrity" that forbids the state from controlling our thoughts, and (2) authority to
control is a prerequisite of authority to punish; if the state may not directly control
an activity on the basis of its wrongness (in this case, thinking), the state is likewise -�
forbidden from imposing criminal sanctions on the same activity after the fact. 2
The second proposition, which Professor Mendlow calls the "Enforceability
Constraint," forms the heart ofhis argument and represents an interesting conceptual
innovation. 3 But it is also, we will see, an implausible account of criminal law.
Though the Enforceability Constraint gives voice to a common sensibility about
police power-that authority to enforce a criminal prohibition follows automatically
from the state's authority to criminalize an activity in the first place-it is this
sensibility itself, not our view of thought crimes, that needs reforming.
The problem runs deep. Despite the novelty ofthe Enforceability Constraint as
a theoretical construct, Professor Mendlow's substantive position is quite
conventional. Our criminal-legal institutions (including courts) customarily assume
a link, in keeping with Professor Mendlow's theory, between prohibition and
enforcement. In fact, it would hardly be an exaggeration to say that all of American
criminal procedure begins from the premise that if activity x has been legitimately
proscribed, enforcement officials who happen upon the occurrence of activity x in
the world are authorized-by virtue of its proscription-to forcibly bring about the
activity's end.
•
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2 Id. at 2370.
3 Id. at 2342.
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This, I will argue, is a philosophical mistake, and one with serious practical
consequences. Part of why policing is so deplorable today-certainly not the only
reason, but an important part of the story-is the political theory that underpins it.
Professor Mendlow's Enforceability Constraint is an effort to name and flesh out
that theory. To the extent it also endeavors to apologize for the theory on normative
grounds, it must be rejected.
Ultimately, Professor Mendlow has the core point backwards. According to
him, the state may not punish at t 2 an activity that officials do not even have authority
to control at ti. The correct theory of criminal law, however, hews the other way:
officials may not control at t, an activity the state does not even have authority to
punish at t 2 . In other words, punishability sets an outer limit on control. The reason
is simple. A legal order that authorized officials to exert direct, physical control
over activities beyond those designatable for criminal punishment would be a police
state, one in which individual law enforcement officers, rather than legislative
bodies-and ultimately, the people-set the bounds of state power.
Professor Mendlow seeks to make the mirror-image claim: that direct
controllability sets an outer limit on punishment. But there is nothing infirm about
a legal order in which officials are not authorized to control every activity
legitimately subject to criminal sanction. In fact, this is likely the mark of a healthy
legal order. As much as the two forms of authority-punishment and policing-are
bound to coincide in practice, we should insist on their separation in principle. And
we should likewise insist that authority to control requires, but is not entailed by,
authority to punish-not the other way around.
Before jumping in, I want to praise Professor Mendlow for making my job easy
and enjoyable. His prose sings; his logic never obfuscates. The entire essay, in fact,
sparkles with the kind of analytic delight promised by the Socratic tradition but too
rarely borne out in the practice of professional philosophizing. No small feat, that.
II.

Let us begin with a point of-significant-agreement: the poverty of existing
accounts of what makes thought crimes verboten. Those accounts, Professor
Mendlow shows, come back to some combination of the following: (1) that thought
crimes would be terribly hard to enforce; 4 (2) that thoughts, even at their worst, are
relatively harmless (by comparison to actions); 5 or (3) that even if thoughts are
harmful, they are not viable candidates for legal culpability.6
Yet on closer inspection, none of these rationales-alone or in tandem--can
shoulder the burden required of them. The first, Professor Mendlow demonstrates,
4
See id. at 2346-47 (outlining the general form of this argument); id. at 2354-58 (exploring a
specific version of the argument, focused on the difficulty of proving thought crimes beyond a
reasonable doubt).
5
See id. at 2347-50.
6
See id. at 2350-54.
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is no argument at all; many crimes end up, in practice, being notoriously hard to
enforce, but this has never been thought to preclude criminalization. 7 To be sure,
enforcement woes may count as apragmaticreason not to criminalize thoughts (or
any other class of activity), but they hardly mount an argument against
criminalization in principle. 8
The second rationale, meanwhile, rests on an implausible theory of the
relationship between thoughts and actions. As Professor Mendlow rightly argues,
at least some thoughts-namely, those involving an intention toward action-can be9
harmful in the same way as reckless conduct: by creating a danger of future injury.
Imagine Mary thinks, "I intend to kill Dan." Assuming Mary is a "competent person
with the means to kill, the danger posed by [her] lethal intention"--the increased
risk of injury it conduces--"could be at least as great as that posed by many risky
activities we seldom think twice about punishing, such as driving recklessly and
possessing volatile explosives."'"
Finally, the third rationale proves to be little more than ipse dixit. If, per the
analysis just offered, thoughts can be harmful (at least to the same extent as
criminally-reckless behavior), why would they be exempt, nonetheless, from legal
culpability? The typical answer is that actions, unlike thoughts, "unleash" effects,".
or, put otherwise, that they "touch[] and make[] an impress on the outside world."' 2
Yet-to quote Professor Mendlow's sharp formulation-an "explanation" of this
form actually "explains nothing."' 3 It restates the "difference between actions and
manner of a dictionary, but it provides "no account
mere mental states," almost in the
' 14
of why the difference matters."
No disagreement so far: in fact, I find Professor Mendlow's dissection of
existing rationales for the prohibition on thought crimes elegant and persuasive. My
concern relates to the essay's second part, where Professor Mendlow aims to solve
See id. at 2356-57.
8 See id. at 2358 ("These risks [related to enforcement] surely give us some reason not to
punish thought. Indeed, they give us some reason to treat punishment for thought as though it were
morally forbidden. But they don't establish that punishment for thought is morally forbidden in fact.").
9 See id. at 2348-49 ("[Other commentators are] simply wrong to assume that unexecuted
intentions risk only a 'small degree of harm.' Consider a person's intention to kill, particularly when
formed after extensive reflection and deliberation. Is such an intention really less likely to cause harm
than driving recklessly or possessing volatile explosives-activities that we don't hesitate to
criminalize on account of their dangerousness? If no lethal intention were more than minimally
dangerous, it would be irrational for me to fear you simply because you intended to kill me. But it's
difficult to accept that such fear is irrational. There would be little point to forming intentions if
intentions didn't generally increase the likelihood of actions.") (internal citations omitted).
7

'o

Id. at 2350.

12

See id. at 2351 n. 17 (compiling sources to this effect).
Id. at 2353. For the canonical statement of this view, see Francis Wharton, Comparative

CriminalJurisprudence,4 CRIM. L. MAG. 1 (1883).
13 Mendlow, supra note 1, at 2354.
14

id.
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his own puzzle by casting "the ban on thought crime as a categorical moral
immunity."15
Here, the idea is that we can appreciate the infirmity of thought crimes by
exploring what makes its conceptual sibling, thought control, wrong. Professor
Mendlow believes the two intolerable for the same reason: punishing thought and
controlling thought both violate one's right to "mental integrity."16 More
specifically, Professor Mendlow thinks the violation occasioned by punishing
thought follows afortiorifrom the violation occasioned by direct interference with
thought, because-and herein lies the fulcrum of his argument-authority to control
is a necessary condition of authority to punish.
Professor Mendlow deems this latter principle the Enforceability Constraint,
and he articulates it numerous ways. For example: "the state may ensure compliance
with a given norm through criminal punishment only when the state may in principle
force compliance with that norm directly."' 7 Or likewise: "[t]he state may punish
someone for transgressions of a given type only when the state may in principle use
reasonable force to thwart such transgressions merely on the ground that they're
criminally wrongful."' 8 Whatever the exact language used, the conceptual upshot is
that ifthe state is empowered to punish activity x, then the state is empowered to
control activity x. With this syllogism in tow, Professor Mendlow's strategy is to
focus on the contrapositive: to disprove the "then" statement-to establish that the
state may not control our thoughts-from which the falseness of the "if' statement
would follow.
In short, Professor Mendlow believes we can rationalize the wrongness of
thought crimes by (1) shoring up the intuition that state-sponsored thought control
is wrong, and (2) establishing that if the state may not directly control an activity,
neither, by logical implication, may it punish the same activity later on. It is the
second of these premises-the Enforceability Constraint-where I take issue.
lII.
Suppose, in a given jurisdiction, it is a crime to voluntarily come under the
influence of substance x; if a person is found to be or have been so influenced, they
may be criminally punished. And suppose, further, that police come across Jones
(in a public park, say), whom they have very good reason to believe has recently
ingested a large amount of substance x. May the police forcibly pump Jones's
stomach, or strap Jones down and inject a counteractive drug, to "force compliance

5

Id. at 2359.

16

Id. at 2342.

17

Id. at 2346.

18

Id. at 237 1.
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with [the law] directly"? 19 Of course not-doctrinally, because of Rochin21 v.
California,2 ° though more importantly, because doing so would be abominable.
By itself, of course, this does not necessarily show that forced compliance with
the substance x law is wrong in principle; it may simply show that stomach pumping
and compulsory injection are impermissible means of forcing compliance. That is
surely what Professor Mendlow would say. In fact, his analysis leans heavily on the
distinction between wrongness in principle and wrongness in practice-even going
so far as to suggest that where, practically speaking, there are no permissible means
of forcing compliance* with a given law, it can still be permissible to do so in
principle. In his words:
[C]ircumstances sometimes arise where the amount of force necessary and
sufficient to stop a given transgression is unreasonably great. Suppose a
narcochemist is manufacturing methamphetamine in a treehouse and the
only way the police can stop him is by cutting the tree down, paralyzing
him in the process. May the police cut down the tree? Clearly not, and
the Enforceability Constraint agrees. What the state may punish, the state
in principle may impede--but only with reasonable force. Unreasonable
force wrongs the narcochemist.... [Even] [i]n a world where no single
instance of a given offense is disruptable through reasonable force-a
world where every narcochemist operates from a fortified treehouse-the
Enforceability Constraint still permits offenders to be punished. The
Enforceability Constraint says that an offense is unpunishable if it's
always wrong in principle to disrupt instances of that offense merely on
grounds of wrongfulness. In a world of fortified treehouse meth labs, it's
always wrong to disrupt meth-making in practice, but it isn't always (or
perhaps ever) wrong to do so in principle.22
I grant Professor Mendlow the treebound-narcochemist case. The question is
whether the same logic applies to Jones the drug user. And the answer depends on
whether we can imagine means of interfering with Jones's activity-reversing his
metabolism of the drug, or forcibly ejecting it from his system-that would be
consistent with basic principles of individual dignity and bodily autonomy. After
all, it is easy to see why shutting down a treehouse meth lab is permissible in
principle; one need only imagine a technological innovation (e.g., a means of aerial
intervention, or a mechanism for causing trees to fall much more slowly to the
ground) that would solve the collateral damage problem. The issue in the
19 /d. at 2346.
20 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
21 The Rochin Court-confronting a situation in which law enforcement officials forcibly
pumped a suspect's stomach to recover evidence-rightly invoked the idea of a "shock to [the]
conscience." Id. at 172.
22 Mendlow, supra note 1, at 2374.
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narcochemist case, in other words, is that stopping this particular instance of methmaking is likely, given its location, to cause severe incidental harm-but there is
nothing infirm, in the abstract, about thwarting meth production. That is Professor
Mendlow's point.
Is the same true of Jones's case? I think not. There, the issue is not that
thwarting the criminal act-undoing the influence of drugs in Jones's system-runs
too great a risk of incidental harm. Rather, undoing the influence of drugs in Jones's
system is the harm, for it is a direct violation of his bodily integrity. This is not to
say, of course, that Jones may not be arrested (or punished) for ingesting substance
x. He may be. Likewise, if there are reasons apartfrom criminal wrongness to
interfere with Jones's bodily integrity--quarantining him, say, or possibly even
pumping his stomach, if the ingestion of substance x poses overwhelming public
safety concerns---that, in theory, could be justified. What matters for Professor
Mendlow's account, however, is whether "the state may in principle use reasonable
' 23
force to thwart [a] transgressionH merely [because it is] criminally wrongful.
Which is just what seems forbidden here.
The "substance x" case is no mere hypothetical. Many jurisdictions have public
intoxication laws, some of which criminalize the act of being under the influence of
alcohol or other drugs unto itself (by contrast to intoxication laws that include an
additional element along the lines of disorderliness). 24 What is more, public
intoxication laws have been explicitly upheld against constitutional challenge, 25 and
there is no reason, in principle, that a state would be forbidden from criminalizing
intoxication across the board, in private as well as in public. 26 (I am not saying this
would be sound policy, obviously; only that it would not disrespect any fundamental
limits on the state's authority to punish.) But even so, state officials would still lack
authority, even in principle, to force compliance with the law directly.
IV.
Of course, even if the Enforceability Constraint falls short as a logical truismin light of laws prohibiting things like intoxication, which qualify (in principle) for
punishment but not direct control-it could still be a valid sociological observation.
Professor Mendlow may be right, in other words, that our criminal-legal institutions
tend to abide by the Enforceability Constraint, even if they do not do so in 100% of

23

Id.at 2371 (emphasis added).

24 See, e.g., Code of Iowa § 123.46(2) ("A person shall not be intoxicated in a public place");
Texas Penal Code § 49.02(a) ("A person commits an offense [under this section] if the person appears
in a public place while intoxicated to the degree that the person may endanger the person or another.").
25

See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).

See, e.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11550 (making it a crime to be under the influence of
a controlled substance, unless administered by a doctor-carrying a penalty of up to one year in county
jail).
26

2020

RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP

405

cases. In fact, I think he is right; the Enforceability Constraint offers a crisp,
philosophically-honed description of existing practice.
The crux of the matter, then, is normative. Professor Mendlow's goal-and
mine, too-is to craft a political theory of criminal law that explains and legitimates
the state's often-violent, more-than-occasionally deadly, exercise of enforcement
power; if not in all times and places, at least in contemporary liberal-democratic
legal regimes. "In our system of criminal administration," Professor Mendlow
writes,
the state may ensure compliance with penal norms not only indirectly
through punishment, but also through direct compulsive force. When
you're selling loose cigarettes, the police may take them from your hand.
When you're making a bomb, the police may escort you from your
laboratory. When you're27 absconding with stolen goods, the police may
stop you and seize them.
The "may" language here is telling; there is more at stake than pattern-recognition.
The goal is to theorize the legitimate exercise of state power-not just to observehow, rightly or wrongly, it tends to get exercised in practice.
What is more, the normative claim has a rich pedigree. Although Professor
Mendlow may be the first scholar to have endowed it with a name, the idea that
authority to punish entails authority to control has long been a feature of our criminal
justice system. The Enforceability Constraint is the contrapositive statement of this
idea. But either way-formulated as P -- Q or -Q -- -P, where P denotes authority
to punish, and Q, authority to control-the upshot is the same. So long as an activity
has been (legitimately) subject to criminal punishment, the police enjoy
corresponding enforcement authority. If they happen on the activity in the world,
they may, in principle, thwart it; and they may also, in principle, place the relevant
actor under arrest, kicking into gear the full machinery of criminal punishment.
Put slightly differently, the mere existence of a criminal statute-assuming the
statute was duly enacted, that it does not run afoul of any substantive limits on state
power (e.g., the prohibition on ex post facto lawmaking), and that its enforcement
adheres to the demands of due process and equal protection-is typically understood
to confer the police authority to enforce the statute's terms. And what is more, it is
understood to confer police authority to use significant force to enforce the statute's
terms. This does not make all enforcement measures fair game, of course. Limits
remain; officials must be reasonable when deciding how much, and what kind of,
force to use. But the threshold grant of authority flows seamlessly-almost
inexorably-from the fact of the underlying law.28

Mendlow, supra note 1, at 2370.
28 See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 16 (Noting that
"typical enabling statute[s] of a policing agency simply authorizel it to enforce the criminal law," but
27
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To appreciate the point more concretely, consider an example of Professor
Mendlow's own: the unlawful selling of loose cigarettes. A person who does so
may be punished.2 9 And if police happen to catch the wayward vendor in the act, he
may be arrested and have his contraband seized-including, if need be, by physical
force. In practice, however, it turns out the vendor could also be subject to greater
intrusion. He could be harassed and humiliated. He could be put in a chokehold.
He could be strangled to death.
The Enforceability Constraint, to be clear, is not to blame for cases like Eric
Garner's, which plainly flout the "reasonable means" constraint that Professor
Mendlow takes care to layer into his account. I hardly mean to lay all manner of
police misconduct at Professor Mendlow's door. The conceptual question, however,
is why reasonableness as to the type of force permitted in the course of law
enforcement-as opposed to the more primary question of whether any direct force
is warranted-should be asked to do so much work. Why shouldn't the reality of
how police wield power today cause us to reconsider the viability of the
Enforceability Constraint as a first principle of criminal law?
In the wake of Eric Garner's murder, Stephen Carter authored an impassioned
defense of taking criminal law quite seriously-far more than we commonly dogiven the enforcement authority it is usually taken to imply:
It's not just cigarette tax laws that can lead to the death of those the police
seek to arrest. It's every law. Libertarians argue that we have far too many
laws, and the Garner case offers evidence that they're right. I often tell
my students that there will never be a perfect technology of law
enforcement, and therefore it is unavoidable that there will be situations
where police err on the side of too much violence rather than too little.
Better training won't lead to perfection. But fewer laws would mean fewer
opportunities for official violence to get out of hand.3"
I share Professor Carter's dismay. And I endorse his admonition that law, and
criminal law especially, is not a plaything to be casually bandied about. Once again,
however, the fundamental question is why should the existence of a criminal lawas an expression of the state's authority to punish a given activity--entail authority
to control the activity as well. That is certainly the operative assumption of criminal
law today. But what drives it?

they "sayf little or nothing about how to do so"-a concrete manifestation of the Enforceability
Constraint).
29 Whether one agrees with the criminalization of selling cigarettes on policy grounds, it seems
beyond doubt-or at any rate, I am assuming arguendo-that such criminalization violates no
fundamental rights.
30 Stephen L. Carter, Law Puts Us All in the Same Danger as Eric Garner, THE VIRGINIANPILOT (Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.pilotonline.com/opinion/columns/article_26a42d3a-b51b-5bb7-

9d58-al Oeada5297c.html.
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Professor Mendlow's answer is the Enforceability Constraint. Echoing other
philosophers of criminal law,31 he believes authority to punish and authority to
control travel together-that it would be, in Professor Mendlow's phrase, "an
anomaly" for there to exist a "crime that32 the state may punish but never forcibly
disrupt on grounds of criminality alone.
Putting aside that intoxication laws already exemplify this "anomaly," the
normative point is that designations of anomalousness---even if true-are no
foundation for political theory. Professor Mendlow could be right that we, in the
"We the people" sense, are not in the habit of authorizing punishment for activities
over which we are not also willing to authorize more direct forms of control. This
hardly means, however, that the same justification underwrites both. Perhaps it is
anomalous-and perhaps it would even be anomalous under ideal political
conditions-for an activity to be legitimately punishable but not subject to more
direct forms of control. Still, the possibility matters. Using force to directly control
an activity (on the basis of its wrongness) is simply a different mode of exercising
power than punishing the same activity after the fact. To observe this difference is
not to suggest that control is always graver, or more injurious, than punishment; the
latter, too, can produce agony, humiliation, and death. It often does so by design.
The point is that control and punishment require different kinds of justificationsand that even in settings (which may be many) where both forms of authority turn
out to be justified simultaneously, one does not stem from the other as a matter of
course.
This does not mean Professor Mendlow is wrong to discern a formal
relationship between authority to punish and authority to control. On the contrary,
he is right to. But the relationship is not one of license; it is one of constraint. For
an activity to be susceptible, in principle, to direct control by state officials in virtue
of its wrongness, it must at least be the sort of activity that can be legitimately
subject to criminal punishment. The reason is simple: it would confer officials too
much power-a sort of power inconsistent with the ideal of self-rule-if they could
control activities, on the basis of claimed wrongness, that could not even be
legitimately designated as crimes.
This is the sense, ultimately, in which authority to control on the basis of
wrongness presupposes authority to punish. Control in the absence of punishability
subverts the rule of law. A legal order that allowed direct control of activities beyond
those legitimately subjectable to punishment would no longer be a democracy. It
would be a police state. For it would give individual officials the power-in at least
some margin of cases-to substitute their own judgments of wrongness for those
made, however imperfectly, by the people.
31 See, e.g., Malcolm Thorbum, Punishment and Public Authority, in CRIMINAL LAW AND THE
AUTHORITY OF THE STATE 7-32 (Antje du Bois-Pedain, Magnus Ulvaing, and Petter Asp eds., 2017)

(arguing, via an extended analogy to parenting, that the state's authority to punish, control, and dissuade
are all coextensive).
32 Mendlow, supra note 1,at 2373.
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V.
When all is said and done, Professor Mendlow has confused a necessary
condition for a necessary and sufficient one. Authority to control requires, but is not
entailed by, authority to punish. Although both, under the right conditions, can be
justified, both also have the capacity to produce serious harms. Yet the harms
diverge; the threat of overzealous policing is simply different from the threat of
overzealous prosecution and incarceration, much as they blend together in practice.
At the level of advocacy, the two might be safely treated as monolithic. At the level
of political theory, however, we should insist on the distinction; and only the more
so if lasting reform-especially around policing-is what we seek.

